Is there something fallacious in these sentences?

[Tryed]

As I said I don't want refutations for any other arguments, I just want some answers for my questions.

[GurrenLagann]

It's not a refutation of another argument. This is about the concept of a "greatest conceivable being" in relation to possible worlds, yes? That's exactly what Plantinga's Ontologicial argument is all about, which is that a greatest conceivable being, if it can exists in any possible world, must therefore exist in all of them, including the actual world.

It's not a change in quantity, just scope.

Possible worlds simple refers to the concept of differing realities, in the sense that something could or could not have been true. So, in some possible world, it can be said that Mitt Romney became the President of the USA by winning the 2012 election.

Wikipedia has a good article on it by the way: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_worlds

[Tryed]

As far as I knew,  the greatest concevable being was "greatest" only in quality and not in quantity, or scope if you prefer. Does it change anything at all?

My question is if I can stick with the multiverse/many universes theory and still not be able to quantify single things by saying that many of this single thing exists in other universes, or have god using scope to exist in all these universes and becoming necessary.

[GurrenLagann]

Scope is not the exact same thing as quantity in this case, it's still the same being.

And the answer to your question is yes methinks. There is no necessity of a god/"greatest conceivable being" there. As I said previously, the possible worlds proposition is an attempt to say that if you admit that the greatest conceivable being exists in a possible world (a possible state of afairs), it then follows that it necessarily exists (although, the argument fails for this reason as well). Multiverse hypothesis isn't quite the same thing as possible worlds.

[GurrenLagann]

Scope is not the exact same thing as quantity in this case, it's still the same being, in this case a being that is supposed to be omnipresent.

And the answer to your question is yes methinks. There is no necessity of a god/"greatest conceivable being" there. As I said previously, the possible worlds proposition is an attempt to say that if you admit that the greatest conceivable being exists in a possible world (a possible state of afairs), it then follows that it necessarily exists (although, the argument fails for this reason as well). Multiverse hypothesis isn't quite the same thing as possible worlds.

[Tryed]

Okay, so I can't use multiple worlds as an excuse to quantify a single being or thing, like saying, "there isn't only one pillow, there are 30 pillows, one in each world". That's invalid.

But I can still say that I exist in some other universes where I'm doing something different right now and say that there are many Tryedzes out there.
Are you sure there is no contradiction?

This is hopefully my final question

[GurrenLagann]

You misunderstood what I was saying about scope (Or I was unclear). I was referring to God, in that the greatest conceivable being is supposed to exist in all places and times. Or something. I was only referring to God.

Well, no. As I say, multiverse aren't the same sort of thing as possible worlds. The latter refers to possible states of afairs ("Mitt Romney possibly became the US President in 2012").

Multiverses don't have the luxury of necessarily having practically innumerable variations like possible worlds.

[Sleeper]

...Multiverse hypothesis isn't quite the same thing as possible worlds.

I think this is key to remember. A possible world is simply the way the world could have been (which is yet undefined by ontological proponents... Ontologists?) A multiverse is worlds that may very well be out there.

But if one takes the ontological argument to it's conclusion, the "being" described would have to be the "greatest" in "everything" (also still undefined). Quality, quantity, ability, thought, action, penis size, everything you could imagine - it's the greatest. I think the apologist means that the being would necessarily exist in whatever world we could have found ourselves in, thus it exists in this one. So it would be one being, one world.

...I know you don't want refutations of the ontological argument, but just as an aside: a "god" wouldn't necessarily be the greatest conceivable being - just one capable of creating a universe. Great compared to us, but there could be a greater being that we're not aware of. If the apologist then says, "well, that being would be God," then we have an infinite regress and no starting point from which to launch the argument.

Is that flawed?

[Tryed]

Ah, so multiple worlds are worlds that our world could have been, it has to do with possibility, and has nothing to do with parallel worlds? I see. Thanks for the clarification.
So assuming there are parallel worlds, in a different parallel world than ours, god may exist, and in another, he may not. Necessity and contingency applies to possible worlds but not parallel worlds then?

Is that right?

[Davka]

Put aside for a moment the concept of the multiverse, and pretend, for the sake of clarity, that the Universe is the sum total of all that exists. If this were the case, the greatest possible (or conceivable) being would be a self-conscious Universe. Such a being would permeate, be made up of, and be equal to the sum total of all that exists. A being greater than this could not exist.

Now, if we accept the multiverse as reality, nothing really changes. The greatest possible (or conceivable) being would be a self-conscious multiverse. Such a being would permeate, be made up of, and be equal to - the sum total of all that exists.

It is possible that such a being does exist, but if it does, you and I would be on its radar to the same degree that the subatomic particles that make up the bacteria in our lower intestinal tracts are on our radar.

[Tryed]

Cool, can I have some other opinions about my last post people?

[Colanth]

Put aside for a moment the concept of the multiverse, and pretend, for the sake of clarity, that the Universe is the sum total of all that exists. If this were the case, the greatest possible (or conceivable) being would be a self-conscious Universe. Such a being would permeate, be made up of, and be equal to the sum total of all that exists. A being greater than this could not exist.

A being that could create that universe, while not itself existing, would be far greater than the being that is the universe.

[GurrenLagann]

Put aside for a moment the concept of the multiverse, and pretend, for the sake of clarity, that the Universe is the sum total of all that exists. If this were the case, the greatest possible (or conceivable) being would be a self-conscious Universe. Such a being would permeate, be made up of, and be equal to the sum total of all that exists. A being greater than this could not exist.

A being that could create that universe, while not itself existing, would be far greater than the being that is the universe.

I think his point can be better expressed as follows, as I think you may have slightly misunderstood his starting point:

1) "Universe" can be used to refer to the totality of existence.

2) The "greatest conceivable being" (GCB) exists.

2.1) Therefore "Universe" includes the GCB within its referential  scope.

3) Nothing greater than the GCB can be conceived of by definition.

3.1) The universe - referring to the sum total of existence itself - can therefore not be greater than, nor encompass, the GCB.

4) Therefore the Universe must necessarily be the GCB.


I hope that was clear (and a correct depiction Davka). :)

Edit: Reread your post. Hm, Colanth that's nonsensical. A being that does not exist couldn't do anything. And that's an old argument, if I recall. :P Like, 50 years old. xD

[St Giordano Bruno]

If a being exists in all possible words, does that mean that he is greater in quantity?
If a being is the greatest in quantity, does it mean that he exists in all possible worlds?

And... are these questions basically the same?

I feel that there is something wrong with them, but I can't put my finger on what it is. Or maybe there isn't. Maybe you guys can help?

I guess I would have to answer "yes" to that. Because if multiverses exist in every possible configuration and combination however difficult that number for us to calculate it would make out existence in this world so inevitable that God is no longer required as a argument for first cause. God would just give way to natural happenstance in a plethora of every possible physical accident.

[Plu]

After having determined that the Universe must neccesarily be the GCB, you can also easily break it down as a meaningless term.

After all; being the same in all worlds, requires it to exist in all worlds. But as it is the entirety of the universe, this requires all worlds to be exactly the same. Thus, there is only one meaningful universe or there is no GCB that is the same in all universes. Either way, end of argument.