Is there something fallacious in these sentences?

[Tryed]

If a being exists in all possible words, does that mean that he is greater in quantity?
If a being is the greatest in quantity, does it mean that he exists in all possible worlds?

And... are these questions basically the same?

I feel that there is something wrong with them, but I can't put my finger on what it is. Or maybe there isn't. Maybe you guys can help?

[Plu]

Quantity is about amount. No matter in how many worlds you exist, you're still just 1. "A being", by definition, cannot have the greatest quantity, because it's just one being.

The questions simply don't make any sense.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Exactly, you have a singular/plural mismatch.

[Tryed]

Ah, then let me explain how I came up with these doubts.

I was thinking about the ontological argument, and about the "Greatest Possible Being". But then I wondered, greatest in WHAT? Greatest in quality or quantity? Or both?
Putting quality aside, I thought what if it was the greatest in quantity. If one thing is the greatest in quantity, I thought how can this ONE thing be greater in quantity if it's ONE being? The only way was for it to exist in various worlds, or so I thought. But I was wondering if this last resort was a valid argument, hence this thread.

I'll be very glad if it's NOT VALID, because I'm an atheist and this is bugging me too much.

And please don't post refutations to the ontological argument if you were going to because I have already dealt with it, and this specific doubt is what is bugging me.

[Tryed]

So I guess the answer is NO to both questions?

[Plu]

It's not valid, no. The whole basic concept of "greatest possible being" is nonsense. You can't be the greatest in a multi-dimensional metric. Only properties that reduce to a scalar can be compared like that.

[Fidel_Castronaut]

The questions simply don't make any sense.

Questions need to be thought through/phrased correctly.

they are non-nonsensical in their current form.

[Tryed]

Sorry, bad english. But Plu got it spot on.

[Tryed]

Ah, also, a being that exists in every possible world is greater in quantity than a being that exists only in some worlds?

Or does the same principle apply to this question as well

[Plu]

It does. It is still the same being. It's the same as asking "is a 10ft tall tree more trees than a 6ft tall tree?"

[Tryed]

Yeah, hahaha
I thought about it like this: There is, for example, a chair. And if this chair exists in 30 worlds, it doesn't mean that there are 30 chairs, one for each world. It simply means that this ONE chair exists in some and does not in others.

[Johan]

Ah, also, a being that exists in every possible world is greater in quantity than a being that exists only in some worlds?

Or does the same principle apply to this question as well

This question is pointless to anyone who does not have first hand knowledge of worlds other than this one.

[Colanth]

The quantity of one being is one, regardless of the rest of the sentence you attach "one being" to.  ("A being" means the same as "one being" in this case.)

[Tryed]

Okay. Now, are our conclusions somehow incompatible with the notion of multiple realities (like schrodinger's cat example)?
Is a chair in this universe the same chair that is in another universe? Or are they two different chairs?

If the latter is true, doesn't that mean that we could quantify the existence of something even though, in this world, there is only one of that thing?

I'm basically trying to figure a way to stick with the notion of multiple universes/realities and the notion that a god cannot be quantified, so no one can say that he exists in
most worlds than anything else, thus making him necessary.

So to summarize, if I stick with multiple universes, am I necessarily agreeing that god can be quantified to exist in all possible worlds if, hypotetically, this god is the greatest possible being?

[GurrenLagann]

Oh dear, I see part of the Plantinga's Ontological argument. Just know that Plantinga's attempt allows you to come to contradictory conclusions from the same argument, and is therefore invalid.