"It" is the ability to experience or to feel and having a sense of selfhood. That's where we start.
You are describing consciousness! I thought we weren't supposed to do that! You said,
"See, you just did it again. You cannot describe it from " I think therefore I am" because "I think therefore I am" only proves existence, it provides no description." and also,
"You cannot describe consciousness or its qualities just from "I think therefore I am" as the only thing it proves is that consciousness exits!"You just
described consciousness as "the ability to experience or to feel and a sense of selfhood," so are you now agreeing that describing consciousness is okay?
Or, I could simply insert my own description like you attempt to do and declare it the more valid definition
"Consciousness is an emergent phenomena which is the result of material properties and interactions."
Which would you rather go with?
Would you be ok with me simply assuming my definition is the correct one or would you rather I prove it.
Let's say you would prefer I prove it... SAME GOES FOR YOU.
You seem to miss the point. "Consciousness is an emergent phenomena
which is the result of material properties and interactions"
assumes a necessary origin, which goes a step beyond mere description.
If I said similarly, "Consciousness is the immaterial phenomena
which is the result of it's fundamental nature inherent in existence itself." Then I would have gone far beyond mere descriptions and
asserted an origin of consciousness, and you would be right to protest if I did so, but I have not done so. I have merely described consciousness, I have not asserted an necessary origin.
Instead of asserting any origin of consciousness, we can merely describe consciousness. Even if consciousness is truly an "emergent phenomena" consciousness itself is still not material. It may be the result of material objects interacting with each other, but the phenomena of consciousness
itself is still immaterial. We can arrive at this description of consciousness without inferring any origin or moving beyond "consciousness exists." We are only describing consciousness.
Asserting an origin of consciousness is moving a step forward, describing consciousness is not.I admit that after "I think therefore I am" ALL possibilities are equally as likely as any other SINCE NO EVIDENCE HAS YET BEEN PRESENTED.
"I think therefore I am" does not prove immaterialism. It does not prove materialism, it does not prove flying spaghetti monsterism.... get it?
Here is the explanation: No evidence has been presented at this point.
We are proceeding step by step therefore right after "I think therefore I am"...
YES, I admit that Flying Spaghetti Monsterism is at least as likely as Materialism or immaterialism or any other idea as no evidence has yet been provided.
That's because you are biased.
Any assertion made without evidence is indeed an assumption, and all assumptions that lack evidence are equally as likely. I can agree to this if you can agree that the starting point is:
1) Consciousness exists.
And
consciousness is described as the ability to experience or to feel and having a sense of selfhood; a phenomena or ability itself having no mass, occupying no space, no definite location, being incorporeal, and immaterial.
If you disagree with this description of consciousness, are you saying that "the ability to experience" is a material object with a measurable mass and velocity and location that occupies space?
We must be able to agree on a description of consciousness before we can go any further, otherwise we have not truly agreed on what exists. We both know that "the ability to experience and have a sense of selfhood" exists, and I say this is a description of something that can only be described as immaterial. Do you agree? Is "the ability to experience" immaterial?
