Well as Sam Harris explained free will can't exist because it's either deterministic or random or a mix of both.
So if it's neither deterministic nor random nor a mix of the two, then what could it be? Once you've excluded "can be exactly predicted," "cannot be predicted at all" and the spectrum between, what's left? It seems like "free" here is defined out of existence and thus Harris's statement is meaningless.
I'm still on the fence regarding determinism. It has very valid and compelling points.
But ... how is spontaneity accounted for? Sam Harris then has a point, and I can be on board with that. It's not all determinism or free will, it likely falls somewhere in between.
That kind of thinking is a faulty intuition pump. The trap that incompatibism wants to draw you into is that the choice is "determinism" or "free will" but not both. Daniel Dennet presented a lecture
that makes the convincing argument that any sort of free will that makes sense only
does so in the context of a deterministic or near-deterministic world. Real
I reject number 4, on the basis that "to have no explanatory cause" is not what is really meant by the "free" in free will.
I could be wrong but I think what is meant here in the idea underlying cause-effect, there is no choice.
Again, that's the faulty intuition pump. Being able to make a choice has nothing to do with cause and effect. In fact, by making a choice in a deterministic universe, you are effecting that cause and effect relationship.
Suppose you knew that the universe was deterministic, and that you knew everything about the universe with enough accuracy to predict what will happen in the future, except
for this little bit of the universe that's happening inside this black box. Does that mean you'll be able to predict what the black box will do? Of course not! It would depend on what's happening in that black box. It also means that you lose precision of what you can predict in the far future because the actions of the black box cannot be taken into account. If the universe is chaotic (and it is), then it gets very much worse the further down the line you go for predicting the future.
It doesn't matter if we knew the universe was deterministic or not: the future cannot
be predicted unless the black box is taken into account. Yet determinism asserts that the future is set by the present, a present we are part of and embedded in. The predictability of a deterministic universe we are part of cannot be realized without taking ourselves into account. To make a choice is to weigh the options available for us and to select from them the action that seems to best realize our motives. The fact that both the weighing and selection, and the origin of our motives have themselves a deterministic mechanism does not negate the fact that the process has happened.
while "free" implies that there would be several options in regard to the effect after the cause has taken place.
The "free" in "free will," as regarded by compatabilists like myself, means that the agent is not coerced or restrained. It does not
mean that the agent is not internally constrained by interior factors. A choice made because the agent is compelled to it by reason and desire is just the damned point of free will.
In practice, that the agent is not coerced or restrained in their choice is exactly
what we mean by free will. Why should this change when we're analyzing it philosophically, unless you want free will to be magic?