CAESAR'S MESSIAH: The Roman Conspiracy to Invent Jesus - OFFICIAL VERSION

[Baruch]

Yes.  But what always confuses me is why not attack on the flanks?

OK, I do understand something about Civil War tactics. 

1.  You could only know what you could see.
2.  Couriers carrying info about where the enemy was was always outdated.
3.  Subordinate generals often didn't act as ordered (and sometimes for good reasons, sometimes for bad ones).
4.  Knowledge of the local terrain was always "iffy".

But one thing that seemingly should have been obvious was that frontal attacks were suicidal.  I've just never understood that part. 

When the Union attacked Confederate posions, it was almost always against entrenchments or at least barriers of felled trees and they lost.  And on the few occasions where the Confederates attacked Union positions, they lost equally.  Obviously, they weren't dumb.  So why?

Bad/good terrain.  The first Union general who arrived at Gettysburg said "good terrain" for the Union, if they could hold the high ground.  The first high ground to the E of Gettysburg (Seminary ridge) was flanked on the right, by the Confederates.  But the Union was able to fall back to an even stronger plan B (Cemetery Ridge).  The wooded N end of Cemetery Ridge formed a hook that protected them from a flanking attack on the right.  Big Round Top was an in-line hill that protected them from a flanking attack on the left.  The Confederates on multiple occasions tried to flank both the right and left.

So why not just go well past Cemetery Ridge on either end?  Because it takes time, and the enemy can see you doing it, and reposition.  Also with maneuvering, at some point you put your line of supply up for grabs by the opposition cavalry.  Needless to say, the frontal attack on Day 3 at Gettysburg was a mistake, as was the prior frontal attack at Fredericksburg.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQXdV4pJIx4

[Cavebear]

Bad/good terrain.  The first Union general who arrived at Gettysburg said "good terrain" for the Union, if they could hold the high ground.  The first high ground to the E of Gettysburg (Seminary ridge) was flanked on the right, by the Confederates.  But the Union was able to fall back to an even stronger plan B (Cemetery Ridge).  The wooded N end of Cemetery Ridge formed a hook that protected them from a flanking attack on the right.  Big Round Top was an in-line hill that protected them from a flanking attack on the left.  The Confederates on multiple occasions tried to flank both the right and left.

So why not just go well past Cemetery Ridge on either end?  Because it takes time, and the enemy can see you doing it, and reposition.  Also with maneuvering, at some point you put your line of supply up for grabs by the opposition cavalry.  Needless to say, the frontal attack on Day 3 at Gettysburg was a mistake, as was the prior frontal attack at Fredericksburg.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQXdV4pJIx4

OK, given that you actually presented a reasonable post I must (sigh) reply. 

1.  Regarding the specific battle of Gettysburg, Lee lost because Stuart was off gallivanting north collecting horses and wagons by beating up local militia while Meade gathered his forces and too the high ground.  And Lee depended on his cavalry for intell. 

2.  For once, Lee wasn't in a place where he knew the terrain better than his opponent. 

3.  And Lee had personal weaknesses.  One was that he couldn't NOT attack due to his personality.  Another was that he had little experience in attacking fortified positions.  He was as bad at it as any Union General.

4.  Lee failed to comprehend the value of the Round Tops.  And when he did, he lost both attempts.  By 1863, the Union army was as professional as the Confederate army.  And old "Snapping Turtle" Meade was exactly the Commander the Union needed at the time

5.  When Lee tried to turn the north flank with cavalry, he was surprised to find the Union had good horsemen too.  Say what you will about Custer's future failure, but he beat the crap out of the Confederate cavalry that day.

6.  We all know about Pickett's Charge, but not everyone knows that Longstreet, Lee's 2nd, knew it was doomed.  He could not even give the command to go forward, sensing the futility to come.

But there is something more important.  A failure of strategic comprehension that baffles me.  Meade was entrenched on the hills and could not well move off.  Lee could have moved his forces at will. 

Without ever having discussed this with anyone previously other than a Confederate re-enacter who was a co-worker, all Lee had to do was slide his army to the south of Gettysburg and march toward Washington DC.  Lee's army was sufficient for the taking of the Union capital and by all understanding of the politics of the time, would have essentially ended the war. 

That Lee did not suggests several things.

1. That he was not strategically-minded.
2. That he was unsure of how to maintain his army in "foreign" territory (and keep in mind his original skill was as a Quarter-master).
3.  He understood how to win battles in territory he knew well but not how to "win the war".

So, accounting for Lee in history, if I needed a General to face someone like Napoleon on home territory, Lee would be a good choice.  But when faced with the unknown, he wasn't.  Lee was possibly the best CIC homeboy ever.  But outside of his familiar grounds, he lost big time and every time. 

My apologies to any of my friends who still raise the Conderate flag.

But aside from all that, the Confederates never had a chance.  The Union had all the industry, better ammo, transport, and they even fought the Indians (no great mark of pride) at the same time. 

The best thing I can say about Lee is that, had he honored his oath of office to the Federal Govt, the war would have lasted maybe a year and about 100,000+ young men would have lived to return to their farms and slavery would have ended sooner. and more peacefully.

Just a few thoughts...

[Minimalist]

The short answer to your question is that advances in military weapons outpaced the tactical imagination of the commanders.  While they had moved away from the Napoleonic concept of columns they had only gotten so far as long lines which was a throwback to the 18th century and meant to maximize firepower.  The thing is that a line is nothing but a thin column and far more unwieldy to maintain in battle conditions.  With a smoothbore French or British musket - and many were still in use at the beginning of the CW - the effective range was something up to 80 yards.  Beyond that a hit was dumb luck.  But rifled muskets were far more effective at ranges up to 250 yards and rifled cannon and exploding shells added to the carnage up to 1,000 yards.

As far as attacking the flanks go that also is on the commanders.  The terrain in northern Virginia especially in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania was such that trying to find the enemy's flank and then march an army to it were daunting prospects.  Any commander who dug a line with his flanks "in the air" as the saying went should have been court-martialed.  So while Lee, who graduated from West Point as an Engineer Officer, may have been the first to realize that digging a hole afforded his men great protection, he also seemed to have a better than average understanding of the tactical advantages of finding a proper defensive position.

At Chancellorsville, Hooker pushed the XIth Corps out to his right and had them dig in facing the confederates.  The flank was "in the air" not anchored against any sort of natural obstacle and Jackson's scouts soon detected it.  In a daring march, Jackson using the superior knowledge of the local roads executed a flawless forced march around the union flank, made a surprise attack and sent the XIth corps running in panic.  Only nightfall saved the Union Army from disaster.

At Gettysburg, the Confederate attacks on Little Round Top were meant to be flank attacks as the 20th Maine was the last regiment on the line.  They held.  But it wasn't as if Lee didn't understand the potential gain.

[Cavebear]

The short answer to your question is that advances in military weapons outpaced the tactical imagination of the commanders.  While they had moved away from the Napoleonic concept of columns they had only gotten so far as long lines which was a throwback to the 18th century and meant to maximize firepower.  The thing is that a line is nothing but a thin column and far more unwieldy to maintain in battle conditions.  With a smoothbore French or British musket - and many were still in use at the beginning of the CW - the effective range was something up to 80 yards.  Beyond that a hit was dumb luck.  But rifled muskets were far more effective at ranges up to 250 yards and rifled cannon and exploding shells added to the carnage up to 1,000 yards.

As far as attacking the flanks go that also is on the commanders.  The terrain in northern Virginia especially in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania was such that trying to find the enemy's flank and then march an army to it were daunting prospects.  Any commander who dug a line with his flanks "in the air" as the saying went should have been court-martialed.  So while Lee, who graduated from West Point as an Engineer Officer, may have been the first to realize that digging a hole afforded his men great protection, he also seemed to have a better than average understanding of the tactical advantages of finding a proper defensive position.

At Chancellorsville, Hooker pushed the XIth Corps out to his right and had them dig in facing the confederates.  The flank was "in the air" not anchored against any sort of natural obstacle and Jackson's scouts soon detected it.  In a daring march, Jackson using the superior knowledge of the local roads executed a flawless forced march around the union flank, made a surprise attack and sent the XIth corps running in panic.  Only nightfall saved the Union Army from disaster.

At Gettysburg, the Confederate attacks on Little Round Top were meant to be flank attacks as the 20th Maine was the last regiment on the line.  They held.  But it wasn't as if Lee didn't understand the potential gain.

I'm impressed.  And I owe an apology.  It was Grant who was Quartermaster; Lee was the Engineer as you said.  I don't get enough discussions like this to keep those details straight.

But, yes, of course, the flanks developed as the war went on.  What was once a straight-on attack became more indirect and both sides learned to develop the kinds of crossfire exemplified in trench warfare at places like Petersburg. 

I was re-watching an episode of Connections 2 just a few days ago where James Burke discussed how to avoid blind zones with star forts in medieval times and immediately thought of US civil war entrenched defenses. 

Oops hit the send button when I didn't mean to...

So I understand what you are saying about straight-on attacks (massed firing with somewhat unaimab;e weapons) at first but that became less of a concern as Union soldiers got rifled weapons and the Confederates it not (except what they collected on the battlefield.  In fact, I am reminded of the Confederate soldiers who complained the Yankees could load up on Sunday and fire all week.

I do understand the difference between "digging a hole" and forming a defensive barrier.  The Confederates were very skilled at "intrenching" and throwing felled trees above their firing positions.  The Union was compelled to attack, and thereby suffer greater losses. 

And yeah, they had to work a while to find generals who could use their strengths. 

But it is worthwhile to note that Sherman usually outflanked his opponents during his "March To The Sea", so the skill was not unknown or impossible.  And Grant DID finally flank around enough to pin Lee onto Richmond and Petersburg.

It is also worth noting that Grant had to get at Lee every whichway and sometimes you just have to beat someone with a club.  In the Civil War, defense almost always won by 2-1.  And the Union soldiers were in territory they usually knew little about. 

Horrid mess...

[Minimalist]

One of the stupidest comments ever made by Abe Lincoln was this:



Said to General McDowell prior to the First Manassas campaign.

While true he totally failed to grasp the inherent difference between attack and defense.  Beauregard was sitting along Bull Run Creek, dug in at the crossings and waiting.  McDowell had to march his army through stifling heat and humidity a distance of 25 miles just to get there.  He then determined to make a flank march to turn the Confederate left but the troops were worn out by the bungling of the commanders and it took hours to get them across the creek.  I've been to Bull Run Creek.  With a little effort you could piss across it but it has steep, muddy, banks and would have been impassable to wagons or artillery caissons except at the crossings.  So while McDowell's inexperienced troops struggled to figure out where to go Beauregard's inexperienced troops had time to react to their situation.  As the federal troops drove the scattered rebel units from one hill to another Jackson, Wade Hampton and JEB Stuart had time to form a defensive line as Johnston's troops arrived by rail.  Jackson's charge against an exhausted enemy which thought itself on the verge of victory only to face another formidable obstacle caused them to rout and panic.  They took the rest of the army with them all the way back to Washington.  Despite winning, the Rebs were unable to organize themselves for a pursuit or the war might have ended that day.

On a personal note, in 1991 I took my son, who was also a CW buff, on a tour of the battlefields in the region.  We were in Manassas 3 days short of the 130th anniversary of the battle, mid July.  The temperatures were in the upper nineties and the humidity was even higher.  We were in shorts and t-shirts and carrying nothing more than a camera and walking on the nicely maintained footpaths installed by the National Parks Service.  And we were fucking dying.  I told him "imagine what it would be like in a wool or flannel uniform carrying your musket, ammo, and some sort of pack and having to climb up and down those hills and ridges."  Later in the war a veteran army could have done it.  But in 1861 it was a recipe for catastrophe.

It's also true that while McDowell outnumbered the Rebs by about 1.5 - 1 both sides only managed to actually get less than 20,000 men into actual combat.  As bad as the training and discipline of the soldiers was the officers down to company level did not know what the fuck they were doing.

[Cavebear]

One of the stupidest comments ever made by Abe Lincoln was this:

Said to General McDowell prior to the First Manassas campaign.

While true he totally failed to grasp the inherent difference between attack and defense.  Beauregard was sitting along Bull Run Creek, dug in at the crossings and waiting.  McDowell had to march his army through stifling heat and humidity a distance of 25 miles just to get there.  He then determined to make a flank march to turn the Confederate left but the troops were worn out by the bungling of the commanders and it took hours to get them across the creek.  I've been to Bull Run Creek.  With a little effort you could piss across it but it has steep, muddy, banks and would have been impassable to wagons or artillery caissons except at the crossings.  So while McDowell's inexperienced troops struggled to figure out where to go Beauregard's inexperienced troops had time to react to their situation.  As the federal troops drove the scattered rebel units from one hill to another Jackson, Wade Hampton and JEB Stuart had time to form a defensive line as Johnston's troops arrived by rail.  Jackson's charge against an exhausted enemy which thought itself on the verge of victory only to face another formidable obstacle caused them to rout and panic.  They took the rest of the army with them all the way back to Washington.  Despite winning, the Rebs were unable to organize themselves for a pursuit or the war might have ended that day.

On a personal note, in 1991 I took my son, who was also a CW buff, on a tour of the battlefields in the region.  We were in Manassas 3 days short of the 130th anniversary of the battle, mid July.  The temperatures were in the upper nineties and the humidity was even higher.  We were in shorts and t-shirts and carrying nothing more than a camera and walking on the nicely maintained footpaths installed by the National Parks Service.  And we were fucking dying.  I told him "imagine what it would be like in a wool or flannel uniform carrying your musket, ammo, and some sort of pack and having to climb up and down those hills and ridges."  Later in the war a veteran army could have done it.  But in 1861 it was a recipe for catastrophe.

It's also true that while McDowell outnumbered the Rebs by about 1.5 - 1 both sides only managed to actually get less than 20,000 men into actual combat.  As bad as the training and discipline of the soldiers was the officers down to company level did not know what the fuck they were doing.

Actually, I can never decide whether that was a wise observation or just encouraging words to a new General.  It makes some sense either way.

Forgive a joke (since you mentioned pissing across Bull Run)  2 guys need to pee while crossing a bridge.  They stand on opposite sides.  One says (jokingingly) "man that water is cold"  And his friend says "and deep".

OK.  Yes, that was a really strange battle.  Neither side really knew what to do (in spite of the Mexican/American War).  It was total chaos, with actual spectators coming out to watch (and really mess up movements) thinking war was all glory and brave charges as if no one would actually be hurt and the one battle would solve everything.   

So sad to remember in hindsight...

I'm glad you mentioned the difficult conditions of wool dress uniforms and the heat or I would have.   I spent years in Petersburg nearly gasping for air at night in bed, so I know. 

[Baruch]

First Bull Run ... Jackson was instructor at VMI.  He knew what he was doing.

Grant did the greatest outflank of the war, in the Vicksburg campaign.  He tried the same thing in Virginia, but the terrain was less helpful to the attacker.

[Cavebear]

First Bull Run ... Jackson was instructor at VMI.  He knew what he was doing.

Grant did the greatest outflank of the war, in the Vicksburg campaign.  He tried the same thing in Virginia, but the terrain was less helpful to the attacker.

No, he didn't.  He was just a math teacher.  But he did have a real talent for war.  IIRC, someone said something like "he would suddenly decide to do something, then do it without any hesitation".  I know I utterly botched that, but the gist is right.

In the West, there were wide open spaces but also impassible barriers.  Vicksburg was a success partly because Grant "would punch his head through a brick wall" (another paraphrase) and because Pemberton thought he could withstand a siege and disobeyed orders to save his army by leaving.

[Minimalist]

The union also controlled the rivers which were essential in the West.

[Minimalist]

thinking war was all glory and brave charges as if no one would actually be hurt and the one battle would solve everything.   

Humans can be incredibly stupid, especially when someone else is doing the dying.

[Baruch]

No, he didn't.  He was just a math teacher.  But he did have a real talent for war.  IIRC, someone said something like "he would suddenly decide to do something, then do it without any hesitation".  I know I utterly botched that, but the gist is right.

In the West, there were wide open spaces but also impassible barriers.  Vicksburg was a success partly because Grant "would punch his head through a brick wall" (another paraphrase) and because Pemberton thought he could withstand a siege and disobeyed orders to save his army by leaving.

Math teacher?  Yes, so that disqualified him how?  So then you take it back and say "a real talent for war".  Of course ... he being a West Point graduate and renowned Mexican War veteran.  What was Joshua Chamberlain?  He knew what he was doing too, though a language professor, without prior military experience, but from a family of veterans.

So yeah, have some more coffee before you post again and embarrass yourself.

[Minimalist]

Um.... one of my uncles was a barber but I can't cut hair.

[Baruch]

Um.... one of my uncles was a barber but I can't cut hair.

I wasn't implying Lamarkism ... but I would be surprised if family stories didn't influence him.  If his family were Tories who escaped from America to Canada, he might have turned out different.

[Cavebear]

Um.... one of my uncles was a barber but I can't cut hair.

As if you must be like your Uncle...

[Minimalist]

Certain skills are not inheritable.