Is the future already written?

[trdsf]

My question was: Do you accept my definition that the future is what will happen?

I would agree that a future will happen, but not that any particular "the" future will happen.

[Cavebear]

I would agree that a future will happen, but not that any particular "the" future will happen.

Agreed.  "A" future is certain.  What that future is, is determined by the present as we experience it , and were affected by, the past.

[Hydra009]

So what do you mean by "choice"? Do you mean "free choice"?

Then we've got the problem where even if you say that free will is free choice... that is still ambiguous because many people think choices are free even if they're determined and there's only one possible future. Many people would say that choices are still partly free even if they're not absolutely free... because even if all our choices are inevitable, there's still a big difference between being coerced and not being coerced when we make a choice.

Tomorrow, I will have cereal for breakfast.  I didn't really choose that so much as I generally have cereal for breakfast since I'm habituated to it and it's readily available.

I know I will never have a breakfast that is either impossible (roast dodo) or highly exotic and unusual (alligator sausage with strawberry crepes and bubble tea) or foods that I utterly despise (grits with sweet tea).  In that way, any choices I make (if I can make choices at all) are constrained to 1) what's on hand 2) what's culturally normal 3) my personal preferences.  Also #1 constrains #2, #2 constrains #3, etc.

Is my future meal predetermined or did I choose it?  It's a very popular idea that I freely chose my meal, yet I didn't choose what's available, what's normal to eat for breakfast in my area, nor what I personally like, and those factors greatly affect the outcome.  Did I freely choose my breakfast?  I don't know, but I'm definitely leaning towards no.

[luckswallowsall]

I would agree that a future will happen, but not that any particular "the" future will happen.

Well, to me the future refers to the future that will happen. A future refers to a possible future, that may or may not happen. I think that the the in "the future" makes all the difference.

Basically "the impossible future" isn't the future.

In fact, "the future that might not happen", isn't really the future.

There is either one possible future, or more than one possible future, but regardless, the future that happens, is the future. That makes the most sense to me.

[luckswallowsall]

Is my future meal predetermined or did I choose it?

I think that this is a false dichotomy.

If your decision is one of many possible futures but that future is entirely randomized, then there's an example of your 'decision' being undetermined but also not a choice.

It's a very popular idea that I freely chose my meal, yet I didn't choose what's available, what's normal to eat for breakfast in my area, nor what I personally like, and those factors greatly affect the outcome.  Did I freely choose my breakfast?  I don't know, but I'm definitely leaning towards no.

I'd be interested to seeing your response for the four different categories I posted above. Those being (a), (b), (c), and (d). And, as explained, those are the only logically possible options because they're logically exhaustive.

[Hydra009]

I think that this is a false dichotomy.

If your decision is one of many possible futures but that future is entirely randomized, then there's an example of your 'decision' being undetermined but also not a choice.

Good point.  I did not consider that.

I'd be interested to seeing your response for the four different categories I posted above. Those being (a), (b), (c), and (d). And, as explained, those are the only logically possible options because they're logically exhaustive.

I tend to go with determinism without free will (atoms after all cannot choose anything).  Not a particularly popular opinion since it seems to undermine moral culpability and human agency (two culturally treasured ideas), yet I fittingly cannot choose any other position.

[luckswallowsall]

I tend to go with determinism without free will (atoms after all cannot choose anything).

I'm not sure which option you've picked from this. It seems that you are saying that you think that there is no free will with determinism. But that could be either option (b) or option (c). Option (b) being the option that free will isn't possible with determinism, but it is possible without determinism, and option (c) being that free will isn't possible with determinism, but it wouldn't be possible with determinism either. I know that, as you have explained, that you don't believe free will is possible with determinism, and it also seems that you are a determinist and therefore don't believe in free will. But even if I know that you both believe in determinism and also believe that free will is incompatible with determinism... I still don't know whether you believe (b) or (c)... because I don't know whether you would believe in free will if you believed in indeterminism instead.

Not a particularly popular opinion since it seems to undermine moral culpability and human agency (two culturally treasured ideas), yet I fittingly cannot choose any other position.

Well, if you believe free will isn't compatible with determinism then you can't choose options (a) or (d)... but you could be either (b) or (c).

[Hydra009]

I still don't know whether you believe (b) or (c)... because I don't know whether you would believe in free will if you believed in indeterminism instead.

Nor do I.

[luckswallowsall]

Nor do I.

That's interesting.

So if you imagine that there is more than one possible future... that could happen... you don't know whether it's true to say that you could choose one of those possible futures or not, even if we assume that premise that there is indeed more than one possible future?

If we assume that determinism is false... you have no idea if free will is true or false in that case?

[Hydra009]

If we assume that determinism is false... you have no idea if free will is true or false in that case?

Correct.

[trdsf]

Well, to me the future refers to the future that will happen. A future refers to a possible future, that may or may not happen. I think that the the in "the future" makes all the difference.

Basically "the impossible future" isn't the future.

In fact, "the future that might not happen", isn't really the future.

There is either one possible future, or more than one possible future, but regardless, the future that happens, is the future. That makes the most sense to me.

An impossible future by definition cannot be the future because it's impossible.

My point is that there is no "the" future that we can say right now will happen, only that there will be (barring an unexpected total existence failure, to borrow from Douglas Adams) future events of some sort.  You can't rule out 'the future that might not happen' right now, because you cannot state which futures are and are not going to happen.  There is no "really the future" because we don't know what's really going to happen except in the very broadest and most general strokes, and the further forward in time you try to look, the less you can say with any sort of certainty.  From our perspective, whatever actually does come to pass can still only be a future because we have no way of differentiating it from any other potential future.

The only kind of "the" future under your terms that I'd be willing to accept is a statement that a split-second from now, very nearly everything is going to be very much as it is at this moment, except having moved a distance determined by its instantaneous speed as modified by its local gravitational field and any obstruction or resistance it may encounter.

I would accept a definition of "the future" as "the set of all possible events that are not physically impossible to occur after this moment in time", but anything more specific than that requires knowledge that we can not and do not have.

[GSOgymrat]

I'm going with C) free will isn't possible with or without determinism. Neuroscience is providing evidence that the sense of a continuous self, the "I", is illusory. Individuals don't have the ability to choose other than they do, regardless of whether the future is fixed or not, because there is no singular "I" making the decision. Split-brain studies seem to indicate individuals can be making decisions her or she is not aware of and making choices before conscious awareness. I also find it more parsimonious that past, present, and future all exist and our perception of time is contingent on our brain's ability to process sensory information rather than there being multiple futures constantly generated from every action that happens everywhere.

[luckswallowsall]

Correct.

I find this puzzling.

I almost want to hope that you wake up tomorrow believing in indeterminism just so you can tell me whether you still no longer believe in free will or if you suddenly think that we can self-determine our behavior in a universe that is entirely undetermined.

[luckswallowsall]

An impossible future by definition cannot be the future because it's impossible.

That was exactly my point.

The only alternative to an impossible future is a possible future.

So if "the future" doesn't refer to "the impossible future" then it refers to "the possible future".

But then the phrase "the possible future" sounds rather odd. I think this is because it only makes sense to speak of a possible future. The possible future would be the actual future.

As far as I'm concerned, "the future" and "the actual future" are interchangeable statements.

My point is that there is no "the" future that we can say right now will happen,

There is if when we say "the future" we are referring to the actual future as opposed to a merely possible or potential future.

only that there will be (barring an unexpected total existence failure, to borrow from Douglas Adams) future events of some sort.

These future events are the future. That's what I'm saying.

You can't rule out 'the future that might not happen' right now, because you cannot state which futures are and are not going to happen.

We can't know which possible future will happen.... and if there's only one possible future... and the future is determined... we still don't know what it is. But we do know that the future will happen, regardless of if it is determined or not. Because, as far as I'm concerned, we know that if anything will happen at all (like you said, barring an actual existence failure as per Douglas Adams) then something will happen. That something, whatever it is, is the future, the actual future. A possible future, is either one or many futures that could happen. However many possible futures there are, whether it's one, or many, that's what I call the future. That's the actual future.

The future is not necessarily determined but it is necessarily inevitable provided that there's any future at all. Any particular possible future is only necessarily inevitable (again, assuming that there's a future at all, barring an existence failure once again) if there's only one possible future. If we assume that determinism is true... then the future is identical with a future... because there is only one possible future under determinism, which must mean that it's identical with the future, under determinism, (again assuming that there's any future at all, we have to bar these existence failures but it's a very small assumption).

There is no "really the future" because we don't know what's really going to happen

I think this is confusing epistemology with metaphysics. We don't have to know what the future will be in order to know that if there's any future at all there must be some actual future. And that actual future is what I mean when I say "the future".

We don't have to know what's going to happen in order to know that something is going to happen. We just have to know that something is going to happen. And, we can't absolutely know that something is going to happen because an existence failure is logically possible (well, actually I'd say that it isn't if we refer to the whole of reality... but I think it is logically possible for time to stop... which is a way of presence without future presence, I guess)... but if we start with the assumption that there will be a future... then we know that there is a the future... because the future is simply whichever possible future actualizes when it arrives.

except in the very broadest and most general strokes, and the further forward in time you try to look, the less you can say with any sort of certainty.  From our perspective, whatever actually does come to pass can still only be a future because we have no way of differentiating it from any other potential future.

Well, the way I see it is, the future=the actual future. A future=a possible future.

I don't think it's the future that we can't know. I think that, if we assume that any future happens at all, then we know that the future is inevitable and will happen. What we don't know, is which possible future is the future. And even if there's only one possible future, we still don't know what it is until it comes along.

I'm not saying that we can predict the nature of the future. I'm saying that provided that we assume that the future will come at all, then we already know that the future will happen, whatever nature the future turns out to have, and whatever it's like. The future=whatever will happen.

The only kind of "the" future under your terms that I'd be willing to accept is a statement that a split-second from now, very nearly everything is going to be very much as it is at this moment, except having moved a distance determined by its instantaneous speed as modified by its local gravitational field and any obstruction or resistance it may encounter.

It doesn't matter how long the future will or won't last. If we assume that there will be a future at all, then we know that it will happen provided that assumption. We just don't know it's nature. But again, that applies both in a deterministic and indeterministic universe.

The future is unpredictable whether there's one possible future or many futures. The future is unpredictable whether determinism is true or false.

I would accept a definition of "the future" as "the set of all possible events that are not physically impossible to occur after this moment in time",

I accept the following definition of the future: "Whatever it is that will actually happen after this moment regardless of its nature."

but anything more specific than that requires knowledge that we can not and do not have.

Not if "the future" simply refers to whatever will happen. If we assume that any future will happen at all, then the future is inevitable, if "the future" simply refers to the actualization of a particular possible future.

We, indeed, can't predict the nature of the future.

But that applies whether determinism is true or false, and whether there's one possible future or many. Prediction is a matter of epistemology, but I'm talking metaphysics. (Or to put it in non-philosophical terms: Predication of the future is a matter of how we can know the future, but whatever "the future" actually refers to is a matter of how we make sense of reality before we even begin to make predictions).

[SGOS]

Split-brain studies seem to indicate individuals can be making decisions her or she is not aware of and making choices before conscious awareness.

Can you separate the unconscious, the thing that makes all the decisions, from the conscious, the "I" that represents a non-thinking automaton that simply acts on orders from the unconscious director?  Is the unconscious incapable of free will?  Or is it capable of making choices?