Is the future already written?

[luckswallowsall]

I accept that YOU are convinced that your constructed 4 arguments these are all that are.  To you.  Quite frankly, I don't give a damn about your arguments because they aren't in MY terms.

That isn't an argument either. Whether you or I are convinced or not is irrelevant. The point is that either free will is compatible with an indeterministic universe but not deterministic one, or it's compatible with a deterministic universe but not an indeterministic one, or it's compatible with both, or it's compatible with neither.

You might as well get used to the idea that most people don't view arguments in your personal terms and that some of them even find them meaningless.

I'm giving impersonal arguments, nor personal arguments. As explained the options I give are logically exhaustive. Either you believe in free will or you don't, either you believe in determinism or you don't, and either you think it's compatible with determinism or you don't.

Just like how either you believe a supernatural being created the universe or you don't. Either you're a theist or an atheist. 

For example, I consider determinism and pre-determinism meaningless.    Don't even bother to try to convince me otherwise, I don't care.   When I was your age, I might have, but I'm beyond that now.

Determinism is simply the view that there's one possible future rather than more than one possible future. It's meaningless for you to simply assert that that's meaningless.

You keep insisting that philosophical determinism and religious predestinationism (or as you call it, religious pre-determinism) are the same thing but they simply don't refer to the same thing at all.

Either there's more than one possible future or there's one possible future. If there's only one possible future (which, like I said, is at least more parsimonious than to assume that there's multiple) it simply does not follow to say that "therefore God". Philosophical determinism simply isn't the same thing as religious predestinationism and simply asserting that it is is not an argument. You can't just add God into the picture without any justification whatsoever.

Try discussing actual facts.  That might actually help you get more real.

Well when it comes to facts the fact is that philosophical determinism isn't the same thing as religious pre-determinism and to say that there's one possible future is not to say that there's a creator of the universe that already knows that future.

[luckswallowsall]

This is exactly my whole point: regardless of the fact that there is a set of events that will come to pass, we don't know that set of events ahead of time in detail, so in fact only "a" future exists from our perspective.

Again, our perspective is irrelevant here. I'm talking of metaphysics, not epistemology. Whether we can know the character of the future or not is simply irrelevant.

My point was that your "whole point" contradicted itself. You said that we use "the" to refer to what is definite but that "the future" is "definitely not definite."

It seems now you are saying that there is no "the future" because we do not know what it is... there are only possible futures.

But again, this is not the case, because whether we can know the future or not is completely irrelevant and even if we could never predict any of it whatsoever even in the tiniest bit and even if it was completely metaphysically impossible to predict any of it whatsoever even in the tiniest bit... that doesn't whatsoever change the fact that our knowledge and prediction of it is completely seperate to whether it actually exists. If there is a future at all then there is an actual future. "The future" refers to the actual future... not a mere possible future. The fact we can't know the future doesn't make it non-actual.

There are also many sets of equally probable events, and quite possibly there are even sets of events that are more probable than what eventually comes to pass.

This is, again, irrelevant. Whatever actually comes to past is the actual future.

So I am explicitly not using 'the future' to refer to an indefinite future, because I'm trying not to use 'the future' at all.

And this is why my semantics are superior to yours... because the actual future will actually come to be whether you like to refer to it as the actual future or not.

If it helps any, I'm also the sort of pedant who's (still) trying to train himself to say 'horizonfall' and 'horizonrise' rather than 'sunrise' and 'sunset'.  :D

My only criticism of you so far is actually that you're not pedantic enough.

[Cavebear]

Something is either true or not true because something either corresponds with reality or it doesn't.

There are problems with both Aristolian and Boolian logic.

For example in Boolian logic if all reptiles are animals and all lizards are reptiles then it doesn't follow that some lizards are animals. But of course if all of X is Y then certainly at least some of X must be Y because all entails some. Boolian logic is absurd and nonsensical in its making sense of the terms in arguments because you can't have all of X and not also have some of X. Again, all implies some.

Aristotlian logic makes a little more sense because Aristotilian logic at least says that if X exists then the conclusion is valid.

But even for Aristotle if all reptiles are animals and all lizards are reptiles then it doesn't even follow that some lizards are reptiles. But again if it's already accepted that all lizards are reptiles then certainly it must be accepted that some lizards are reptiles... because, once again, all entails some. If literally the whole totality of something exists then certainly some of it must of... because all of it is certainly some of it. Both Boole and Aristotle have incorrect interpretations of universals.

But the point here is that something either is or isn't the case. Either X or not X. The idea that something can be both true and untrue is absurd. Some have said that this leads to paradoxes like the Liar's Paradox, but the Liar's Paradox only seemingly comes about due to a mistake that has already been solved in at least two ways. To say that a sentence is true is identical to saying that it is... so to speak of a sentence being not true isn't to actually say anything if we haven't added any content yet. So one way of looking at it is the only reason it's not true nor false to say that the sentence is not true is because there is no sentence to speak of that is actually complete.

Another way of looking at it is that to say that "This sentence is true" is equivalent to saying "This whole sentence is true and" so "This sentence is not true" would mean "This whole sentence is true and not true" which is just a contradiction.

And the point is that already explained you are either in group (a), (b), (c) or (d). Those options are indeed logically exhaustive but even if you try to wriggle out of it with alternative definitions of logic and truth... you still haven't given any good reason for how it can even make sense to say that it isn't the case that free will is compatible or incompatible in any deterministic or indeterministic universe. What on earth are you even supposed to be saying if you think that free will is neither compatible nor incompatible with a deterministic or indeterministic universe?

It's very simple... either you think that free will can exist in both a deterministic universe and indeterministic universe, or you think that it can exist in one but not the other, or you don't think that it can exist in either. Trying to wriggle out of all of these options is just completely absurd.

Your argument borders on the absurd (I'm being polite).  Mere set theory demonstrates it.  Or don't they teach that these days.  All lizards are reptiles and all reptiles are animals, therefore all lizards are animals.

I have yet to meet a lizard that is not an animal.  ;)

[Mr.Obvious]

There are laws of physics and they permit random events.  And none involve deities.

Let's create in our minds 2 identically programmed computers to play chess with each other.  Would every game end in a draw?  In the same way?

Even such randomness would not be 'true' randomness in the way we hypothetically mean. The 'seeming' randomness is achieved through, as I understand it, through pseudo-random number generators and other built in algorythms determining the moves. So even though it may seem 'random', in truth we are simply not recreating the same conditions between two games of two computers. In fact, there will never be two moments in which the same conditions apply.

[luckswallowsall]

I've tried to say 'horizonfall' and 'horizonrise' rather than 'sunrise' and 'sunset' myself at times, but it is like trying to push a rope.  Society fights it, language fights it, and (in spite of what I know to be true), logic fights it.  Sometimes you just have to communicate in accepted terms.  Not that I don't try in writing...

Well if you wish to communicate in accepted terms then there's no need to redefine "philosophical determinism" to mean "religious predeterminism" when it simply doesn't mean that. I don't have to constantly explain over and over that I'm talking about the view that there is only one possible future (and not, despite what you say, referring to a god at all) just because you don't accept the fact that philosophical determinism actually refers to that view that indeed says nothing about a got at all. Just because there is only one possible future doesn't mean that a creator of the universe envisoned it. That simply does not follow. That's no less absurd than saying that just because there's multiple possible futures means that multiple different gods envisioned them. Philosophical determinism doesn't imply monotheism any more than philosophical indeterminism implies polytheism.

[luckswallowsall]

Also, I DO use future to be uncertain.  Mostly because we don't actually know what current events make any difference.  But also, thinking of the "butterfly effect" it is still too much a coin flip.  I wish that made more sense, but I can't accept that the future is fixed in any way.  Maybe it is depending on what we all do today, but it changes depending on what we do 2 minutes from now.

What REALLY annoys me is that I'm usually good at talking in "time", but not in this particular way.

Again, whether the future can be predicted or not is a separate view to whether there's more than one possible future or not... and just because there may in fact only be one possible future doesn't mean that there's any god out there that envisioned it.

There's literally no possible evidence for or against philosophical determinism or indeterminism as they are both completely scientifically unfalsifiable. Philosophical determinism simply holds the advantage of being more parsimonious as there's simply no reason whatsoever to believe that there is more than one possible future. There may be but there's no reason to think it. One is enough and it is indeed best not to postulate more entities than necessary.

[Cavebear]

Well if you wish to communicate in accepted terms then there's no need to redefine "philosophical determinism" to mean "religious predeterminism" when it simply doesn't mean that. I don't have to constantly explain over and over that I'm talking about the view that there is only one possible future (and not, despite what you say, referring to a god at all) just because you don't accept the fact that philosophical determinism actually refers to that view that indeed says nothing about a got at all. Just because there is only one possible future doesn't mean that a creator of the universe envisoned it. That simply does not follow. That's no less absurd than saying that just because there's multiple possible futures means that multiple different gods envisioned them. Philosophical determinism doesn't imply monotheism any more than philosophical indeterminism implies polytheism.

Look, you can argue until the cows come home that predeterminism doesn't require a deity to enforce it.  Its that you simply don't understand quantum fluctuations (nor do I) but the universe as it exists seems to require "randomness" at some level and you aren't allowing for that.  And, since your arguments don't allow for the universe as it is, they must be faulty. 

[Cavebear]

Again, whether the future can be predicted or not is a separate view to whether there's more than one possible future or not... and just because there may in fact only be one possible future doesn't mean that there's any god out there that envisioned it.

There's literally no possible evidence for or against philosophical determinism or indeterminism as they are both completely scientifically unfalsifiable. Philosophical determinism simply holds the advantage of being more parsimonious as there's simply no reason whatsoever to believe that there is more than one possible future. There may be but there's no reason to think it. One is enough and it is indeed best not to postulate more entities than necessary.

Something that is unfalsifiable is not scientific.

And what is this now about multiple futures?  I thought you argued against that previously.

[luckswallowsall]

The future is like that - there's a definite future, we just don't know what.

Indeed. And one example of how the terms I use are the correct ones here is the fact that you can talk about all your predictions of what the actual future will be and then talk about it all all over again and not change a single word except you omit the word "actual" and talk of "the future" instead of "the actual future" and neither nothing in the meaning of what you've said nor nothing in the meaning of what you've actually said change nor actually change (see what I did/actually did there?).

The future=the actual future. And there actually will be an actual future, whatever it will in fact turn out to be, regardless of your predictions, knowledge (or lack thereof) of its nature or actual nature.

[luckswallowsall]

I would disagree that there is a definite future; there are only probabilities until the events actually happen.

That doesn't change the fact that the actual events, whatever they are, definitely will actually happen, won't they not?

[Cavebear]

Indeed. And one example of how the terms I use are the correct ones here is the fact that you can talk about all your predictions of what the actual future will be and then talk about it all all over again and not change a single word except you omit the word "actual" and talk of "the future" instead of "the actual future" and neither nothing in the meaning of what you've said nor nothing in the meaning of what you've  actually said change or actually change (see what I did/actually did there?).

The future=the actual future. And there actually will be an actual future, whatever it will in fact turn out to be, regardless of your predictions, knowledge (or lack thereof) of its nature or actual nature.

Are you giving up on the predictable one future determined by the events in the past (the present is oh so fleeting)?

[luckswallowsall]

There will be a future

To say that the actual future will occur is the same thing as saying that there will be a future. The fact that the actual future that will occur is one of many possible futures is irrelevant and whether there's one or more than one possible futures doesn't change the fact that the actual future will indeed happen and there will, indeed, actually be an actual future, which is the future/the actual future.

[luckswallowsall]

It seems to me that only a deity could force that level of determinism.

One possible future is no more forced by one god than two possible futures are forced by two gods.

[Cavebear]

Even such randomness would not be 'true' randomness in the way we hypothetically mean. The 'seeming' randomness is achieved through, as I understand it, through pseudo-random number generators and other built in algorythms determining the moves. So even though it may seem 'random', in truth we are simply not recreating the same conditions between two games of two computers. In fact, there will never be two moments in which the same conditions apply.

That would seem to allow that 1+1 will not always equal 2 in normal counting.

But keep in mind I said 2 "identical" computers.  If you want to indulge in theory, you have to allow for truly identical computers.

[luckswallowsall]

Determinists choose that position for a reason.  Don't know if it is random or predetermined ;-)

"Random or predetermined" is a false dichotomy.

"Determined or not determined" is the true dichotomy.