What are your views on the nature of morality? By which I mean, do you think morality is objective, subjective or relative?
I'm assuming that none of you believe there can be an absolute morality.
Agreed, is subjective and we are influenced by our "environment".
Morality is an idea so it's subjective. There have been differing views on what's moral and what's not through the ages, so it's relative. Relative and subjective are orthogonal.
Quote from: "Colanth"Morality is an idea so it's subjective. There have been differing views on what's moral and what's not through the ages, so it's relative. Relative and subjective are orthogonal.
Unfortunately, I'll have to parrot what Bill Craig says to this because I think he nails it on this point. What you're referring to is Moral Epistemology, how we come to know what is moral, not Moral Ontology, what is actually moral and the morality that we come to know through epistemology.
If it feels good, do it. If some one bigger or with a gun tells you to stop, you stop. Then you kill them and do it anyway.....
Have you read Michael Sandel's "Justice?"
The age of consent varies in many countries. Each has developed what they consider is an appropriate age.
This is what they define as "moral".
Does that mean one country is more moral that another if the ages vary?
I would suggest this example demonstrated "morals" are subjective.
Nature has not developed the human body so all males and females are capable of sex at exactly the same age.
Yet different societies make rules on what is moral and what is not.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Colanth"Morality is an idea so it's subjective. There have been differing views on what's moral and what's not through the ages, so it's relative. Relative and subjective are orthogonal.
Unfortunately, I'll have to parrot what Bill Craig says to this because I think he nails it on this point. What you're referring to is Moral Epistemology, how we come to know what is moral, not Moral Ontology, what is actually moral
"What is actually moral" assumes that morality is objective. Since there's no such thing as morality unless there's a sentient mind (morality, unlike copper, exists only in at least one sentient mind), morality isn't objective, so there's no such thing as "what is actually moral" unless you redefine the word "morality".
Quote from: "Colanth"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Colanth"Morality is an idea so it's subjective. There have been differing views on what's moral and what's not through the ages, so it's relative. Relative and subjective are orthogonal.
Unfortunately, I'll have to parrot what Bill Craig says to this because I think he nails it on this point. What you're referring to is Moral Epistemology, how we come to know what is moral, not Moral Ontology, what is actually moral
"What is actually moral" assumes that morality is objective. Since there's no such thing as morality unless there's a sentient mind (morality, unlike copper, exists only in at least one sentient mind), morality isn't objective, so there's no such thing as "what is actually moral" unless you redefine the word "morality".
Someone like Craig (not me) would respond that God's commands constiture our moral duties, and what God commands is good because its goodness is grounded in his nature, hence he answers your question (for his side). /devil's advocate
I realized I never gave my views on morality. I suppose I would have to say, I'm not really sure. Sam Harris' argument from "The Moral Landscape" on how science can determine what is objectively moral (good book, by the way) can be summarized as follows:
-When we speak of morality, we always smuggle in things which concern the well-being of conscious creatures.
-So, morality can be equated with that which promotes the well-being and flourishing of concious creatures.
-The well-being of concious creatures falls within the purview of science: medicine, psychology, neurology, biology, etc.
-Well-being may be hard to define. However, physical health is also hard to define, yet we do know things that about what makes people not be physically well, so to with overall well-being.
-Therefore, science can tell us what is objectively moral, since morality can be equated with promoting the well-being of concious creatures.
What do you all think of Harris' attempt?
Harris pretty much convinces me that an science of morality could be feasible, whether or not his own try at it is completely sound.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"What are your views on the nature of morality? By which I mean, do you think morality is objective, subjective or relative?
I'm assuming that none of you believe there can be an absolute morality.
Morality is an evolved trait that stems from our nature as pack animals. It has to do with getting along with the group, or tribe. This is usually balanced and sometimes in conflict with the well-being of an individual. Our ability to empathize with an individual allows us to care about an individual who may be at odd with the group, such as, say, burning a witch at the stake.
Morality is an amalgam of a bunch of confused concepts and emotive statements that are either false or nonsensical. Occasionally moral statements can be true as long as they're held to a specific standard either implicit or explicit (e.g. kindness is GOOD (for creating social bonds and being nonthreatening to others), you SHOULD try to be fair (if you care about treating people equally in some regard or another). However, there is no absolute morality or categorical imperatives. And pretending as such often turns out to do more harm than good, as moral language confuses people, distracts them from the actual issues that could be addressed directly if people weren't engaged in distracting wild goose chases about who's "accountable" for what and what actions are "permissible" or "Justified", and has the ability to mobilize people to commit great acts of harm for completely made-up reasons. Just like religion. I find ethical realism and religion to hold many parallels. They both cause harm due to convincing people to do harmful things for made-up reasons, it mobilizes people to do dangerous things who wouldn't normally mobilize, and it has lots of magical properties assuming really bizarre facts of the world (that something's "good") which somehow compel people to do something through a vague, almost magical mechanism (imperatives).
To riff off of Steve Weinberg: "Kind people will be kind. Cruel people will be cruel. But to get kind people to do cruel things, that takes morality."
In short, using fancy philosophical terms, I'm a moral abolitionist and metaethical pluralist who holds moral statements to be a mix of emotive exclamations, false or nonsense statements, and implicit end-relational claims. I am sympathetic, however, to virtue ethics, and find utiliarianism to be of use under certain circumstances (although it is not "morality" in and of itself).
Individual morality is just the tendency to act on ideas about how the world should be. In a social context (i.e. as an institution), morality is the willingness to act on the ideas OF OTHERS about how the world should be. Obviously, these are going to come into conflict.
But saying you want to discard morality is goofy. It's equivalent to saying you don't think people should act on ideas of what the world should be like-- which is an expression of YOUR idea of what the world should be like. So is saying "We should all be free to define morality as we see fit."-- because that's an appeal to a social agreement, i.e. the beginning of a new kind of moral institution.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"I realized I never gave my views on morality. I suppose I would have to say, I'm not really sure. Sam Harris' argument from "The Moral Landscape" on how science can determine what is objectively moral (good book, by the way) can be summarized as follows:
-When we speak of morality, we always smuggle in things which concern the well-being of conscious creatures.
Which, since it requires the existence of at least one conscious mind, makes it subjective.
Quote-Therefore, science can tell us what is objectively moral, since morality can be equated with promoting the well-being of concious creatures.
Nonsense. I can prove that 1 = 2 much more easily (and with just as false a premise).
QuoteWhat do you all think of Harris' attempt?
Since morality is an opinion, it's inherently subjective - by definition. Any attempt to "prove" that there can be an objective morality is an attempt to prove the blackness of white.
Quote from: "Colanth"Morality is an idea so it's subjective. There have been differing views on what's moral and what's not through the ages, so it's relative. Relative and subjective are orthogonal.
Exactly.
Quote from: "Colanth"Which, since it requires the existence of at least one conscious mind, makes it subjective.
Er, no. If there is a rough idea of what one is talking about when you say "well-being", it necessarily
cannot be subjective by definition, anymore than claiming that physical health is just a subjective term that can't be grasped.
QuoteNonsense. I can prove that 1 = 2 much more easily (and with just as false a premise).
Exaggeration, and I'd like to see you do it, rather than merely assert it. ;-)
QuoteSince morality is an opinion, it's inherently subjective - by definition. Any attempt to "prove" that there can be an objective morality is an attempt to prove the blackness of white.
You could only really show conclusively (or convincingly imo) that morality is just an opinion if you overcome the fact that there is a difference between moral epistemology and moral ontology.
And the blackness of white is exactly zero. ;-)
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Er, no. If there is a rough idea of what one is talking about when you say "well-being", it necessarily cannot be subjective by definition, anymore than claiming that physical health is just a subjective term that can't be grasped.
Nonsense. Anyone who has survived chemotherapy understands that health, too, is a relative thing.
QuoteAnd the blackness of white is exactly zero. ;-)
Pretty sure that was his point which you just made.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Er, no. If there is a rough idea of what one is talking about when you say "well-being", it necessarily cannot be subjective by definition, anymore than claiming that physical health is just a subjective term that can't be grasped.
Nonsense. Anyone who has survived chemotherapy understands that health, too, is a relative thing.
You're conflating the fact that the meaning of the word isn't some perfectly defined thing with the (false) assertion that we don't know what
doesn't constitute it. That doesn't make the concept of health just relative (we have much understanding of what doesn't constitute good health, or promoting it). Well-being is a term that would very much fall in line with that in Harris' argument.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"QuoteAnd the blackness of white is exactly zero. ;-)
Pretty sure that was his point which you just made.
No, he said that since "morality is an opinion [...] any attempt to "prove" an objective morality is is an attempt to prove the blackness of white". That would work for MY points, not his since we can- by definition- define that black is the absense of whiteness, just as we can define health and well-being in a similar, blacklisting manner, though given their fuzzy definitions (by necessity) no list could be exhaustive.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Er, no. If there is a rough idea of what one is talking about when you say "well-being", it necessarily cannot be subjective by definition, anymore than claiming that physical health is just a subjective term that can't be grasped.
Bullshit, by definition then the universe has wellness or health?
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"You could only really show conclusively (or convincingly imo) that morality is just an opinion if you overcome the fact that there is a difference between moral epistemology and moral ontology.
Bulshit², even though the moral is epistemologically analyzed, the methodology can achieve objective results, but doesn't change its character subjective, just as people's faith alter reality but don' prove the existence of god.
Ontologically then exponentially increases the bullshit. Metaphysics is pure subjectivity!
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"No, he said that since "morality is an opinion [...] any attempt to "prove" an objective morality is is an attempt to prove the blackness of white". That would work for MY points, not his since we can- by definition- define that black is the absense of whiteness, just as we can define health and well-being in a similar, blacklisting manner, though given their fuzzy definitions (by necessity) no list could be exhaustive.
That, too, is a subjective defnition. Blackness is the property of absorbing all spectra in an object.
When perception and sensation are involved, subjectivism becomes an issue. There is obviously an objective universe, but the simple fact is that everyone sees that objective from a slightly different vantage point. Some folks are color-blind. Their conception of red is entirely different from mine.
When you move the conversation over to the abstract universe -- where morality resides -- you are necessarily moving into the subjective realm.
(//http://i1104.photobucket.com/albums/h321/SabrinaTheInkWitch/9cae8d0f.jpg)
for threads about morality
hahahah, it is a tooth-puller, eh?
Quote from: "Mathias"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Er, no. If there is a rough idea of what one is talking about when you say "well-being", it necessarily cannot be subjective by definition, anymore than claiming that physical health is just a subjective term that can't be grasped.
Bullshit, by definition then the universe has wellness or health?
You're not making any sense dude. The universe isn't a concious, living being, therefore trying to apply 'well-being' to it is about the stupidest response you could've made.
QuoteQuote from: "GurrenLagann"You could only really show conclusively (or convincingly imo) that morality is just an opinion if you overcome the fact that there is a difference between moral epistemology and moral ontology.
Bulshit², even though the moral is epistemologically analyzed, the methodology can achieve objective results, but doesn't change its character subjective, just as people's faith alter reality but don' prove the existence of god.
Ontologically then exponentially increases the bullshit. Metaphysics is pure subjectivity!
1) I'm afraid I don't follow. There's nothing in Harris' argument that even corresponds to your example of faith and God's existence.
2) Cool story.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"No, he said that since "morality is an opinion [...] any attempt to "prove" an objective morality is is an attempt to prove the blackness of white". That would work for MY points, not his since we can- by definition- define that black is the absense of whiteness, just as we can define health and well-being in a similar, blacklisting manner, though given their fuzzy definitions (by necessity) no list could be exhaustive.
That, too, is a subjective defnition. Blackness is the property of absorbing all spectra in an object.
When perception and sensation are involved, subjectivism becomes an issue. There is obviously an objective universe, but the simple fact is that everyone sees that objective from a slightly different vantage point. Some folks are color-blind. Their conception of red is entirely different from mine.
When you move the conversation over to the abstract universe -- where morality resides -- you are necessarily moving into the subjective realm.
I take your point (and his, if that's what he was going for) about sense perception.
However, you didn't really address what else I (or rather Harris) says. Particularly about how well-being would seem to fall into the same category of physical health. We know objective facts about what is and isn't condusive to being healthy. Objectively, it is true by what we mean when we say 'physical health' that there are in fact wrong answers, even if you don't know every single right answer ("How fast should a healthy person be able to run?"). The equivalent of what some are saying would be to question the philosophical underpinnings of medicine and say something along the lines of "Well how can you say that not throwing up constantly makes me objectively less healthy than you?"
Harris asserts that whenever you talk about morality and what is moral, you always refer to the well-being of some concious creature (rape, muder, etc), so you can equate morality with what is condusive to well-being, and his basis for his argument lay there.
I think that that is an overreach on his part. I understand what's being said, that we can define a moral act in direct proportion to what it adds to well-being. But what of an action that is ambiguous? What of an action that calls for sacrificing someone else? But making a prescription for what benefits a body, and making a prescription for what benefits a mind, those are two different things.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"I think that that is an overreach on his part. I understand what's being said, that we can define a moral act in direct proportion to what it adds to well-being. But what of an action that is ambiguous? What of an action that calls for sacrificing someone else? But making a prescription for what benefits a body, and making a prescription for what benefits a mind, those are two different things.
Sacrificing someone else in what context?
On what are you founding that claim though? The two address a somewhat fuzzy area that nontheless can be said to have objective truths. And things that affect the body can and often do have effects on the mind (lucidity first comes to mind). Well-being would entail both in any case. And the cogntive sciences has been having interesting developments in this regard.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Harris asserts that whenever you talk about morality and what is moral, you always refer to the well-being of some concious creature
And he's wrong.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"I think that that is an overreach on his part. I understand what's being said, that we can define a moral act in direct proportion to what it adds to well-being. But what of an action that is ambiguous? What of an action that calls for sacrificing someone else? But making a prescription for what benefits a body, and making a prescription for what benefits a mind, those are two different things.
Sacrificing someone else in what context?
Is the guy who jumps on the grenade to save the rest of the company performing a moral or immoral act? (From the viewpoint of his own well-being?)
Quote from: "Colanth"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Harris asserts that whenever you talk about morality and what is moral, you always refer to the well-being of some concious creature
And he's wrong.
Like I said to you earlier, rather than simply assert it, explain why that is the case. More specifically, where does morality NOT have to do with the well-being of concious creatures.
Otherwise it's just the "Nuh-uh" defense. :-/
Quote from: "Colanth"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"I think that that is an overreach on his part. I understand what's being said, that we can define a moral act in direct proportion to what it adds to well-being. But what of an action that is ambiguous? What of an action that calls for sacrificing someone else? But making a prescription for what benefits a body, and making a prescription for what benefits a mind, those are two different things.
Sacrificing someone else in what context?
Is the guy who jumps on the grenade to save the rest of the company performing a moral or immoral act? (From the viewpoint of his own well-being?)
Again, a fundamental misunderstanding. Harris' argument doesn't simply refer to your own well-being, but overall. If by taking the brunt of the grenade that dude saves everyone else, he by definition prevented a greater decrease to well-being.
GurrenLagann, for me, Harris' argument falls flat due to one basic, unsupported assertion: that conscious beings have an inherent right (or whatver you may call it) to well-being. It may seem self-evident to most of us, but that's only because our innate survival instinct engenders us with the urge to live and preserve life. Ultimately, this is an opinion, even though it's aone of the most universally accepted opinions ever held. And opinions have no place in standards of objectivity.
The blind assumptions here actually go a few levels deeper - we assume not only that conscious beings should exist, but that life should exist, even though we have no cold, hard facts to prove it. Even further, we contend that the perpetuation of the earth and the universe is a "good" thing. And, as hard a pill as that may be to swallow, all of that is arbitrary. It all comes from our flawed human minds, and we have no way of knowing if, on the cosmic scale, our minds are correct. It's merely what we've decided works best for our species. (And, really, we are the only species that has been given a proper choice in the matter! That can't be fair.)
Consider that the existence of even one suicidal person, or insane serial killer, who does not recognize the value of the conscious lives of himself or others, debunks Harris' proposition. For a broken mind is still a mind, and since only other minds have judged insanity to be an invalidating factor, those other minds merely hold competing subjective opinions to those of the suicidal/ insane. There is no acceptable standard, if we really put things in perspective, and refuse to cheat the matter.
I'm confused, because I don't recall Harris making the claim that we have an inherent right to well-being. Rights are things we grant (self-evidently) ourselves, not. existent things themselves. Harris' assertion is that we know what is condusive to well-being (which he says morality can be equated to since they are never found apart in discussions on morality) and therefore it can be objectively said what is moral.
So it has nothing to do (if I remember correctly) with saying that life and well-being are intrisically valuable, but that we know what does and does not work to furthering those.
Now, you're follow up question will be probably be along the lines of "Why you should be moral?", which is not the same thing as "What is moral? / How do you decide if something is moral?" which I think is what Harris' intent was.
I don't recall if Harris goes over this, but it's my view is that this is a mistaken view that came to prominence with Kant. I mean, you could go with straight up utilitarianism and consequentialism, which is all fine and good to me. You reflect on the consequences of your actions and consider what would appear to be condusive to well-being (and not just your own, as that can end up reducing your own).
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"You're not making any sense dude. The universe isn't a concious, living being, therefore trying to apply 'well-being' to it is about the stupidest response you could've made.
I said just the opposite, cause you who asked for evidence that morality is subjective, that it's stupid.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"1) I'm afraid I don't follow. There's nothing in Harris' argument that even corresponds to your example of faith and God's existence.
The attempt to assert that morality has something objective, leads to metaphysics as an abstraction grants a character solipsistic. "I think, it's real."
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Colanth"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Harris asserts that whenever you talk about morality and what is moral, you always refer to the well-being of some concious creature
And he's wrong.
Like I said to you earlier, rather than simply assert it, explain why that is the case. More specifically, where does morality NOT have to do with the well-being of concious creatures.
Otherwise it's just the "Nuh-uh" defense. :-/
Please try to keep up. I'm not going to restate the entire history of my conclusion in every sentence. Sometimes, the reason for one paragraph is in the next paragraph.
QuoteQuote from: "Colanth"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Sacrificing someone else in what context?
Is the guy who jumps on the grenade to save the rest of the company performing a moral or immoral act? (From the viewpoint of his own well-being?)
Again, a fundamental misunderstanding. Harris' argument doesn't simply refer to your own well-being, but overall.
"some concious creature" (your words, and what I responded to) refers to the well-being of a single creature, not "overall".
QuoteIf by taking the brunt of the grenade that dude saves everyone else, he by definition prevented a greater decrease to well-being.
But the well-being of "that dude" (a concious creature) was greatly (some would say ultimately) decreased.
Please return the goal posts to their previous position.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"I'm confused, because I don't recall Harris making the claim that we have an inherent right to well-being. Rights are things we grant (self-evidently) ourselves, not. existent things themselves. Harris' assertion is that we know what is condusive to well-being
Only according to our own definition of well-being, which is both circular and totally subjective.
Quote(which he says morality can be equated to since they are never found apart in discussions on morality)
Since we've discussed morality without mentioning well-being right here on this forum, he's wrong about that.
Quoteand therefore it can be objectively said what is moral.
Since the basis is incorrect, the conclusion is invalid. And, in this case, incorrect.)
QuoteSo it has nothing to do (if I remember correctly) with saying that life and well-being are intrisically valuable, but that we know what does and does not work to furthering those.
No, it's saying that life itself has some intrinsic value that's greater than non-life. That's what he's saying. Whether you can understand that it's what he's saying is another matter.
QuoteNow, you're follow up question will be probably be along the lines of "Why you should be moral?", which is not the same thing as "What is moral? / How do you decide if something is moral?" which I think is what Harris' intent was.
But the discussion isn't how to decide whether something is moral, but whether morality itself has some objective existence or whether it's purely subjective. How we decide whether something is moral is the same whether morality is objective or subjective.
QuoteYou reflect on the consequences of your actions and consider what would appear to be condusive to well-being
That only works is morality has some direct relation to well-being, which you Kant and Harris never show. (Asserting it isn't showing it.)
Quote from: "Mathias"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"You're not making any sense dude. The universe isn't a concious, living being, therefore trying to apply 'well-being' to it is about the stupidest response you could've made.
I said just the opposite, cause you who asked for evidence that morality is subjective, that it's stupid.
Elaborate? You can assert that it's subjective (or rather that there are no objective moral values), but I really am waiting to read how that explain how.
QuoteQuote from: "GurrenLagann"1) I'm afraid I don't follow. There's nothing in Harris' argument that even corresponds to your example of faith and God's existence.
The attempt to assert that morality has something objective, leads to metaphysics as an abstraction grants a character solipsistic. "I think, it's real."
Except Harris' attempt is exactly a way to avoid having to do that (and he's by no means the first to try it), hence the subtitle "How Science can Determine our Moral Values".
Quote from: "Colanth"Please try to keep up. I'm not going to restate the entire history of my conclusion in every sentence. Sometimes, the reason for one paragraph is in the next paragraph.
Well, considering you never actually answered this bit (as far as I saw), I didn't see the problem with asking you to answer, since "And he's wrong", is about as much of an answer as me responding "And he's correct".
Quote"some concious creature" (your words, and what I responded to) refers to the well-being of a single creature, not "overall"
I've more properly referred to Harris referring to the overall well-being in other posts I believe.
QuoteBut the well-being of "that dude" (a concious creature) was greatly (some would say ultimately) decreased.
Please return the goal posts to their previous position.
And if the argument was merely referring to only taking into account your own well-being, you may have had a point.
They never moved. You went for a field goal on the opposite side of the field.
Spoilered for length:
[spoil:20x2fnjg]
Quote from: "Colanth"Only according to our own definition of well-being, which is both circular and totally subjective.
That was nonsensical. EVERYTHING is defined by us. Based on your reasoning above, we don't know anything objective about health since health is defined by us. Or truth. Or anything else because we define the terms.
QuoteSince we've discussed morality without mentioning well-being right here on this forum, he's wrong about that.
Example?
QuoteSince the basis is incorrect, the conclusion is invalid. And, in this case, incorrect.)
I disgree clearly, as per the above.
QuoteNo, it's saying that life itself has some intrinsic value that's greater than non-life. That's what he's saying. Whether you can understand that it's what he's saying is another matter
I don't recall him saying that anywhere. His argument is clearly stated by him simply as "Once you realize that what is moral depends on the well-being of concious creatures, you also realize that there can be objectively valid moral statements made about what is moral." It never says anything about life having any intrinsically more valuable than non-life.
Again, you've entirely missed the point from a previous response of mine to you, which is that you're confusing "What is moral?" with "Why be moral?" which are not the same questions, just as "What is truth?" is not the same questions as "Why be truthful?" This distinction has a crucial difference.
QuoteNow, you're follow up question will be probably be along the lines of "Why you should be moral?", which is not the same thing as "What is moral? / How do you decide if something is moral?" which I think is what Harris' intent was.
QuoteBut the discussion isn't how to decide whether something is moral, but whether morality itself has some objective existence or whether it's purely subjective. How we decide whether something is moral is the same whether morality is objective or subjective.
The discussion from my OP yes, but I also made a follow up question in a different post (the one you've been responding to) about what you all thought about Harris' attempt to show that objectively moral statements can be made, which is not the same thing.
QuoteThat only works is morality has some direct relation to well-being, which you Kant and Harris never show. (Asserting it isn't showing it.)
I thought I gave rudimentary examples earlier (why rape, murder,etc are immoral), and later asked you what discussions on morality here that you've been a part of that discuss what is moral
without smuggling in concerns of the well-being of sentient beings; I await an answer.[/spoil:20x2fnjg]
Morality is only partially subjective.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"I think that that is an overreach on his part. I understand what's being said, that we can define a moral act in direct proportion to what it adds to well-being. But what of an action that is ambiguous? What of an action that calls for sacrificing someone else? But making a prescription for what benefits a body, and making a prescription for what benefits a mind, those are two different things.
Sacrificing someone else in what context?
What if killing one person would save twenty, even though the one person had nothing to do with the others? Is it moral to kill an innocent man to save more innocent men?
Certainly an objective morality would have a concrete position on this sort of thing. It's hardly a new question.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"I think that that is an overreach on his part. I understand what's being said, that we can define a moral act in direct proportion to what it adds to well-being. But what of an action that is ambiguous? What of an action that calls for sacrificing someone else? But making a prescription for what benefits a body, and making a prescription for what benefits a mind, those are two different things.
Sacrificing someone else in what context?
What if killing one person would save twenty, even though the one person had nothing to do with the others? Is it moral to kill an innocent man to save more innocent men?
Certainly an objective morality would have a concrete position on this sort of thing. It's hardly a new question.
Thanks for elaborating. :)
I suppose on Harris' argument, that would be the objectively moral thing to do. I recall in his debate against Craig, he said something along the lines of (from memory; not exact), "There are many highs and lows on my Moral Landscape, and yes it may be said that we may have to - at times - descend into a valley so as to ascend to higher peaks."
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"What if killing one person would save twenty, even though the one person had nothing to do with the others? Is it moral to kill an innocent man to save more innocent men?
Certainly an objective morality would have a concrete position on this sort of thing. It's hardly a new question.
Thanks for elaborating. :)
I suppose on Harris' argument, that would be the objectively moral thing to do. I recall in his debate against Craig, he said something along the lines of (from memory; not exact), "There are many highs and lows on my Moral Landscape, and yes it may be said that we may have to - at times - descend into a valley so as to ascend to higher peaks."
Now, imagine yourself to be that single man whose death has been deemed moral. How fair would the decision strike you? The morality of the act would likely involve the nature of the decision-making process (were you consulted at all? Were your feelings considered?). The morality of the decision would also rely upon the certainty of your death saving the others (if your death only
might save the others, would it be as moral a decision as one taken knowing that your death would certainly save the others?)
That thought exercise exemplifies why I think morality is both relative (to the circumstances of the moral act) and subjective (reliant at least in part upon one's relationship to the act).
Now there's a reply of the sort I've been waiting for. Elaboration makes things easier to understand and talk about. :)
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Sacrificing someone else in what context?
What if killing one person would save twenty, even though the one person had nothing to do with the others? Is it moral to kill an innocent man to save more innocent men?
Certainly an objective morality would have a concrete position on this sort of thing. It's hardly a new question.
Thanks for elaborating. :)
I suppose on Harris' argument, that would be the objectively moral thing to do. I recall in his debate against Craig, he said something along the lines of (from memory; not exact), "There are many highs and lows on my Moral Landscape, and yes it may be said that we may have to - at times - descend into a valley so as to ascend to higher peaks."
So what's the objective reason that sacrificing an innocent man to save more than one innocent man is moral? (An objective moral code would have an objective reason for an act being moral.) Harris' statement above has nothing to do with the question.
It's the lifeboat question all over again - and no one has ever come up with an objective answer.
Quote from: "Colanth"So what's the objective reason that sacrificing an innocent man to save more than one innocent man is moral? (An objective moral code would have an objective reason for an act being moral.) Harris' statement above has nothing to do with the question.
It's the lifeboat question all over again - and no one has ever come up with an objective answer.
If you're goal is to improve the overall well-being (as well as prevent as much damage to well-being as you can), then your question answers itself when put that way. When there is certainty in the outcome, what to do to best preserve or improve well-being can in fact be assesed. Hence why Thumpalumpacus' example works while yours doesn't.
And how does it not have to do with the question? I already stated that it was a separate question from my OP that I made in my 2nd post on the 1st page (and the 2 can't even be construed as having been the same question). If you know the outcome (you, an innocent, die to certainly save 20 other innocents) then you can make an objectively moral assessment on what action to take on Harris' argument on what morality is.
That in no way obligates you to do so (that's one weakness with a lot of moral theories like Kant's), as there is nothing about morality that binds one to do anything. Again, it would be like jumping from "Why be truthful?" when asked "What is truth?"
I don't think abstract ideas can have a "nature." The idea is made up by people to represent a relationship between feelings, ideas and behaviors. But exactly what you mean by any of those things, or which aspects of their relationships you are representing with the word "morality," are arbitrary.
If by morality you mean the tendency of the human brain to react to certain kinds of stimuli in certain ways, I'd argue that's objective-- variable, but approachable with neuroscience and statistical analyses. If by morality you mean how we "should" act, and what parts of our world "should" elicit particular responses, then it's completely subjective.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Colanth"So what's the objective reason that sacrificing an innocent man to save more than one innocent man is moral? (An objective moral code would have an objective reason for an act being moral.) Harris' statement above has nothing to do with the question.
It's the lifeboat question all over again - and no one has ever come up with an objective answer.
If you're goal is to improve the overall well-being (as well as prevent as much damage to well-being as you can), then your question answers itself when put that way.
That's not an objective reason to improve overall well-being - which an objective morality has to provide. It's assuming that there's an objective reason for doing so, then addressing how to objectively do so. It's a good proof - but of the wrong thing.
QuoteAnd how does it not have to do with the question?
The question of whether there's an objective morality depends on whether there's an objective morality. I'd think that would be kind of obvious. Proving that there's an objective way to assess how to reach a goal isn't showing that the goal is objectively moral - or that there's any such thing as objective morality. You keep sidestepping that point. You prove all sorts of objective things - but you're assuming an objective morality without showing that there's any such thing.
You'll have to show that, absent any mind (objectively - inherent in the thing itself), there's a reason for something to be "better" (more moral) than some other thing. (And, since "better" is purely subjective, you're trying to prove something that, at the very least, is impossible. IOW, "objective morality" is an oxymoron.)
QuoteI already stated that it was a separate question from my OP that I made in my 2nd post on the 1st page (and the 2 can't even be construed as having been the same question). If you know the outcome (you, an innocent, die to certainly save 20 other innocents) then you can make an objectively moral assessment on what action to take on Harris' argument on what morality is.
Only if there's an objective reason to kill one person to save 20, and that's the point that still hasn't been addressed. You're using your assertion that there's an objective morality as evidence that there's an objective morality.
Before you can address anything
about objective morality (which is all you and Harris are doing) you have to show that there
is an objective morality (basically some "objective better") - which you've both failed to do so far.
Quote from: "Colanth"Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Quote from: "Colanth"So what's the objective reason that sacrificing an innocent man to save more than one innocent man is moral? (An objective moral code would have an objective reason for an act being moral.) Harris' statement above has nothing to do with the question.
It's the lifeboat question all over again - and no one has ever come up with an objective answer.
If you're goal is to improve the overall well-being (as well as prevent as much damage to well-being as you can), then your question answers itself when put that way.
QuoteThat's not an objective reason to improve overall well-being - which an objective morality has to provide. It's assuming that there's an objective reason for doing so, then addressing how to objectively do so. It's a good proof - but of the wrong thing.
And yet again, you've confused two different things. As I say above, you're confusing what is moral (on Harris definition of it) with why be moral? That's a distinction you're not taking into account. If we know what we mean by "well-being", Harris' assertion is that we can then determine what is the objectively right thing to do if you wish to preserve and/or improve it.
QuoteThe question of whether there's an objective morality depends on whether there's an objective morality. I'd think that would be kind of obvious. Proving that there's an objective way to assess how to reach a goal isn't showing that the goal is objectively moral - or that there's any such thing as objective morality. You keep sidestepping that point. You prove all sorts of objective things - but you're assuming an objective morality without showing that there's any such thing.
If, when you talk about morality, you necessarily are referring to what relates to the well-being of concious creatures (Harris asserts that you cannot refer to what is moral without doing so), then it can be said that actions can be objectively assesed to be moral or not. An assessment of whether or not an action is objectively moral is not an assessment of the "nature" of morality, since it isn't some existent thing. It's a description of an action.
The equivalence of what you are doing is if I said "It is objectively the case that if you want to win a track race, you should run the fastest", and then you follow up with "Yeah, but is running objectively running?" It's validation (i.e why you should do it) is in the statement itself, with relation to intent. It doesn't say anything about you needing to do so.
QuoteYou'll have to show that, absent any mind (objectively - inherent in the thing itself), there's a reason for something to be "better" (more moral) than some other thing. (And, since "better" is purely subjective, you're trying to prove something that, at the very least, is impossible. IOW, "objective morality" is an oxymoron.)
Er, no. "Absent a mind", morality is a vacuous term on Harris' definition. Only concious beings have the potential to be moral agents, so absent a mind it's strictly a meaningless concept. And since on Harris' argument well-being can be somewhat defined with respect to flourishing of sentient beings, what is "better" can in fact be assesed (at least in principle). And you've confused objective with intrinsic, which aren't fully interchangeable. An atom's mass is an intrinsic quality, but an atom's position can be assessed objectively but it isn't intrinsic.
QuoteOnly if there's an objective reason to kill one person to save 20, and that's the point that still hasn't been addressed. You're using your assertion that there's an objective morality as evidence that there's an objective morality.
If your goal is to preserve or improve well-being, then your question falls as answered. You're forgetting that the is-ought can be crossed via goal-directed intention (as per my track race example earlier).
QuoteBefore you can address anything about objective morality (which is all you and Harris are doing) you have to show that there is an objective morality (basically some "objective better") - which you've both failed to do so far.
I've responded to this in an above quote I believe. You're talking about morality as a sort of thing, rather than a description of actions.
I'm reminded of the people who, when attempting to denigrate Islam, they bring up Aisha, and refer to Muhammed as a pedophile, when it was perfectly "moral" and culturally acceptable at the time. The child bride thing is still accepted in many cultures today, but the west finds it morally unacceptable. Morals are cultural constructs. Period.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"You're talking about morality as a sort of thing, rather than a description of actions.
Because you're using the word that way. An "objective description of actions" is fallacy of equivocation when you're talking about objective morality.
Quote from: "Jmpty"I'm reminded of the people who, when attempting to denigrate Islam, they bring up Aisha, and refer to Muhammed as a pedophile, when it was perfectly "moral" and culturally acceptable at the time. The child bride thing is still accepted in many cultures today, but the west finds it morally unacceptable. Morals are cultural constructs. Period.
And, as such, are subjective by definition.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"Elaborate? You can assert that it's subjective (or rather that there are no objective moral values), but I really am waiting to read how that explain how.
Although not a simple discussion and "running away" from a long-winded philosophical debate, I think that there's nothing absolute in human actions and thoughts, cause it is impossible to differentiate some moral value, (self) rationally stated goal, of a subjective decision, selfish, empathic, or even insane.
Being simpler, where is the proof that there is objectivity in subjectiv's values???
It would be almost the same as proving god's existence. Ie, another distorted religious metaphysics, whose best explanation is the person realize that faith removes neurons.
Cannibalism was, and still is morally acceptable in some cultures, as is human sacrifice, burning witches, stoning, female genital mutilation, etc. These things that western morality finds abhorrent, are not viewed as such by those who do not share the same social, moral construct that we share in the west. It doesn't make their culture "immoral' objectively, only immoral by our standard, which proves once again the subjective nature of morality.
There are certain features in us, as a social species, that pretty much define what we consider moral and which we have words for, such as compassion and empathy. However, I find it hard to justify ethics if it doesn't somehow include our genetic makeup as a social species.
Quote from: "Sal1981"There are certain features in us, as a social species, that pretty much define what we consider moral and which we have words for, such as compassion and empathy. However, I find it hard to justify ethics if it doesn't somehow include our genetic makeup as a social species.
I could imagine a society in which feelings such as
compassion and
empathy are regarded as moral failings.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"Quote from: "Sal1981"There are certain features in us, as a social species, that pretty much define what we consider moral and which we have words for, such as compassion and empathy. However, I find it hard to justify ethics if it doesn't somehow include our genetic makeup as a social species.
I could imagine a society in which feelings such as compassion and empathy are regarded as moral failings.
See: Ancient Sparta, for one.
I am reminded of DeGaulle who, if I recall correctly, once asked, " how can one govern a country that has over 350 cheeses?"
Every argument posted here must rely on a relative unknown that we somehow refuse to consider, and that is that the human character is not 1 to 5 and then/or 95 to 100. The human character unfortunately runs from 1 to 100.
We first must realize that even in a "given" culture there are those who reject that "moral code, those morays". The human animal is not so easy to describe and pin down as many psychos would like to suggest. No doubt the majority of the majority can be pigeonholed, but that leads us to understand that the variety among the "normal" is sufficient to realize that no code of conduct can ever be applied correctly if we also allow free will of an individual. Not to suggest that is it right or wrong to rape kids, but is it wrong to self mutilate? And what is mutilation? Tatoos? Even here we have subjective views.
60 years ago Katchatorian and Lunde decribed what even today is bizarre cultural behaviors. Cultures where kidnapping and raping a woman was not just normal but an expected way of matrimony. Children picked at random to be the male lover of the chief, no matter his opinion. Children expected, no demanded to actually defeat their father in battle in order to become a man. Cultures where parents masturbated their children. In all these cultures there is no claim of rampant disfunction. 200 years ago girls were commonly raped and yet survived, they were far hardier than we are today. 200 years ago boys were men at 14 and expected to fight and die and had no qualms about it.
Society and culture change, and we have these discussion trying to pigeonhole that which at this time cannot be pigeonholed, and may never be. We try to evolve into a better world and a more compassioned people but there are many among us who can never view even such simple things as mild masochistic behavior as abnormal. I applaud the attempt, but do not get discouraged and mad when you meet resistance, just when you think the battle is won, the door opens and someone new walks in.
I will preface this by saying there has been a lot of bad--shocking bad--forms of reasoning and lines of argumentation. Like, from atheists, this is particularly shocking.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"What are your views on the nature of morality? By which I mean, do you think morality is objective, subjective or relative?
I'm assuming that none of you believe there can be an absolute morality.
So I presume you're asking a metaethical question, yes? You're not asking which normative theory is best (utilitarianism, deontology or virtue ethics), yes?
I'm not sure what you mean by "absolute morality." Do you mean something like moral realism? Where moral realism is defined as the family of views that moral propositions are true independent of any particular judgements about them and that moral states of affairs have their properties irrespective of any particular judgement about them.
Why would you think atheists don't like this view? It's not a theistic view--like divine command theory. It's a fairly popular view. Most philosophers--who are atheists btw--claim to be moral realists. Why think this view is untenable among atheists?
Honestly, i'm sympathetic to moral realism. Though there are serious problems for the view. Check out Evolutionary Debunking Arguments for Moral Realism.
Believing that there can be an absolute morality is not the same as believing there is one.
Quote from: "Jmpty"Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"Quote from: "Sal1981"There are certain features in us, as a social species, that pretty much define what we consider moral and which we have words for, such as compassion and empathy. However, I find it hard to justify ethics if it doesn't somehow include our genetic makeup as a social species.
I could imagine a society in which feelings such as compassion and empathy are regarded as moral failings.
See: Ancient Sparta, for one.
Not a very good society since it went extinct because of their eugenics and militaristic state. A good read of the history of ancient Sparta is in Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sparta (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sparta)
Thought about it for a while.
What I'm getting at is that evolution has granted us some intuitive sense, often referred to as a moral compass, as to what feels right and wrong, simply because good moral behavior had a greater chance of surviving and passing on those genes via natural selection. Although I have a hard time explaining why animals that aren't social have been so successful, I reckon social animals have been more successful than unsocial (not to be confused with antisocial) animals. That the mechanism of natural selection somehow favours social behavior more because it works better than unsocial behavior. But I'm getting over my head here, I know too little about sociability from a genetic perspective.
Forgot about this thread. I'll be periodically answering some responses.
Quote from: "Chaoslord2004"I will preface this by saying there has been a lot of bad--shocking bad--forms of reasoning and lines of argumentation. Like, from atheists, this is particularly shocking.
If it was from me (strong possibility), could you point out where and how I goof'd?
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"What are your views on the nature of morality? By which I mean, do you think morality is objective, subjective or relative?
I'm assuming that none of you believe there can be an absolute morality.
QuoteSo I presume you're asking a metaethical question, yes? You're not asking which normative theory is best (utilitarianism, deontology or virtue ethics), yes?
Indeed.
QuoteI'm not sure what you mean by "absolute morality." Do you mean something like moral realism? Where moral realism is defined as the family of views that moral propositions are true independent of any particular judgements about them and that moral states of affairs have their properties irrespective of any particular judgement about them.
Moral absolutism meaning that something is intrinsically, necessarily moral or immoral, irrespective of any and all circumstances and intents. (i.e "killing is always immoral") It is often supported by theists, though it tends to be easily broken down and forced to moral objectivism/universalism (namely, Divine-Command theory).
QuoteWhy would you think atheists don't like this view? It's not a theistic view--like divine command theory. It's a fairly popular view. Most philosophers--who are atheists btw--claim to be moral realists. Why think this view is untenable among atheists?
I wasn't refering to moral realism. :) It's a bit... different. :P
QuoteHonestly, i'm sympathetic to moral realism. Though there are serious problems for the view. Check out Evolutionary Debunking Arguments for Moral Realism.
Will do. :)
Quote from: "Sal1981"Not a very good society since it went extinct because of their eugenics and militaristic state. A good read of the history of ancient Sparta is in Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sparta (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sparta)
Thought about it for a while.
What I'm getting at is that evolution has granted us some intuitive sense, often referred to as a moral compass, as to what feels right and wrong, simply because good moral behavior had a greater chance of surviving and passing on those genes via natural selection. Although I have a hard time explaining why animals that aren't social have been so successful, I reckon social animals have been more successful than unsocial (not to be confused with antisocial) animals. That the mechanism of natural selection somehow favours social behavior more because it works better than unsocial behavior. But I'm getting over my head here, I know too little about sociability from a genetic perspective.
Establishing a pragmatic yardstick for moral imperatives doesn't really mean much. Strip away the overlaid morality and go with the practical reasoning altogether, if that's the case.
The argument that
the moral compass is biological is given the lie by the fact that different societies practice different moral codes. Also, not all moral behaviors are "visible" to natural selection. Telling the truth can be deadly, yet we hold it to be moral.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"The argument that the moral compass is biological is given the lie by the fact that different societies practice different moral codes. Also, not all moral behaviors are "visible" to natural selection. Telling the truth can be deadly, yet we hold it to be moral.
How does there being some variation among societies in regards to moral codes invalidate the possibility of it being biologically endowed? Variation of behaviors and beliefs is something that is rampant throughout our species.
How would truth-telling not be 'visible' the natural selection? There are situations in which doing so could be deadly, but come on man, how often have you (or anyone you know) been in a situation in which it was the case in which telling the truth would have life threatening consequences? Conversely, trouble tends to follow rather axiomatically from lieing once it's discovered, and it would seem to be far more likely in very ancient socieities and onward that it (lieing) would be far more likely to have adverse consequences.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"[spoil:v8hv9yzc]Quote from: "Sal1981"Not a very good society since it went extinct because of their eugenics and militaristic state. A good read of the history of ancient Sparta is in Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sparta (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Sparta)
Thought about it for a while.
What I'm getting at is that evolution has granted us some intuitive sense, often referred to as a moral compass, as to what feels right and wrong, simply because good moral behavior had a greater chance of surviving and passing on those genes via natural selection. Although I have a hard time explaining why animals that aren't social have been so successful, I reckon social animals have been more successful than unsocial (not to be confused with antisocial) animals. That the mechanism of natural selection somehow favours social behavior more because it works better than unsocial behavior. But I'm getting over my head here, I know too little about sociability from a genetic perspective.
[/spoil:v8hv9yzc]
Establishing a pragmatic yardstick for moral imperatives doesn't really mean much. Strip away the overlaid morality and go with the practical reasoning altogether, if that's the case.
I view it as top-down. I.e. morality is a subset of reason, such that you can use reason to all moral behavior, but not the other way around. But this is shifting focus from moral behavior in species and how that is present.
Quote from: "Thumpalumpacus"The argument that the moral compass is biological is given the lie by the fact that different societies practice different moral codes. Also, not all moral behaviors are "visible" to natural selection. Telling the truth can be deadly, yet we hold it to be moral.
I didn't mean that evolved moral behavior is in anyway exhaustive or covers all moral behavior, nor did I state that anywhere.